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Date: April 29, 2024 Mon
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Results for federal bureau of prisons
10 results foundAuthor: Charles Colson Taskforce on Federal Corrections Title: Transforming Prisons, Restoring Lives: Final Recommendations of the Charles Colson Task Force on Federal Corrections Summary: After decades of unbridled growth in its prison population, the United States faces a defining moment. There is broad, bipartisan agreement that the costs of incarceration have far outweighed the benefits, and that our country has largely failed to meet the goals of a well-functioning justice system: to enhance public safety, to prevent future victimization, and to rehabilitate those who have engaged in criminal acts. Indeed, a growing body of evidence suggests that our over-reliance on incarceration may in fact undermine efforts to keep the public safe. Momentum is strong for a new direction, for a criminal justice system guided by proven, cost-effective strategies that reduce crime and restore lives. But translating this impulse for reform into lasting change is no small challenge. This report provides both an urgent call to action and a roadmap for reforming the federal prison system, which, with 197,000 people behind bars, was the largest in the nation as 2015 drew to a close. By adopting the recommendations detailed here, and committing sufficient resources to ensure their effectiveness, we can reduce the federal prison population by 60,000 people over the coming years and achieve savings of over $5 billion, allowing for reinvestment in programs proven to reduce crime. Most important, these proposed reforms and savings can be achieved through evidence-based policies that protect public safety. Such savings will not only bring fiscal responsibility to a policy area long plagued by the opposite tendency, but will also free critical funds the US Department of Justice (DOJ) needs for other priorities, such as national security, state and local law enforcement, and victim assistance. And just as critically, these reforms will make our communities safer by ensuring we send the right people to prison and that they return to society with the skills, supervision, and support they need to stay crime free. While enacting these initiatives may seem daunting, doing nothing is not a sustainable option. The United States has the highest incarceration rate in the world, confining more than 2.2 million people in its jails and prisons on any given day. Sentencing reform and other policy changes will reduce our reliance on prison and cut costs as we reconsider which people truly need to be behind bars and for how long. But the country still faces the enormous challenge of reintegrating millions of formerly imprisoned people back into society, where the enduring stigma of a criminal record complicates their efforts to find housing and jobs. Fortunately, signs of meaningful progress shine brightly in the states. Lawmakers from Texas, Utah, Georgia, South Carolina, and a host of other states have re-examined government's expensive preference for incarceration and have embraced a more diversified, evidence-based approach that delivers better public safety at less cost. Reform has come much more slowly at the federal level. Despite recent reductions, the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) has experienced a seven-fold increase in its population since 1980. Costs have spiked right along with that growth. Now almost $7.5 billion, federal prison spending has grown at more than twice the rate of the rest of the DOJ budget and accounts for about one-quarter of the total. Details: Washington, DC: The Urban Institute, 2016. 132p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed January 27, 2016 at: http://colsontaskforce.org/final-recommendations/Colson-Task-Force-Final-Recommendations-January-2016.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: http://colsontaskforce.org/final-recommendations/Colson-Task-Force-Final-Recommendations-January-2016.pdf Shelf Number: 137694 Keywords: Correctional InstitutionsCosts of PrisonsCriminal Justice ReformFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ReformPrisons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Monitoring of Contract Prisons Summary: The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP), which is the component of the Department of Justice (Department) responsible for incarcerating all federal defendants sentenced to prison, was operating at 20 percent over its rated capacity as of December 2015. To help alleviate overcrowding and respond to congressional mandates, in 1997 the BOP had begun contracting with privately operated institutions (often referred to as "contract prisons"), at first on a smaller scale and later more extensively, to confine federal inmates who are primarily low security, criminal alien adult males with 90 months or less remaining to serve on their sentences. As of December 2015, contract prisons housed roughly 22,660 of these federal inmates, or about 12 percent of the BOP's total inmate population. These contract prisons were operated by three private corporations: Corrections Corporation of America; GEO Group, Inc.; and Management and Training Corporation. The BOP's annual expenditures on contract prisons increased from approximately $562 million in fiscal year (FY) 2011 to $639 million in FY 2014. In recent years, disturbances in several federal contract prisons resulted in extensive property damage, bodily injury, and the death of a Correctional Officer. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated this review to examine how the BOP monitors these facilities. We also assessed whether contractor performance meets certain inmate safety and security requirements and analyzed how contract prisons and similar BOP institutions compare with regard to inmate safety and security data. We found that, in most key areas, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions and that the BOP needs to improve how it monitors contract prisons in several areas. Throughout this report, we note several important corrective actions the BOP has taken, in response to findings and recommendations in our April 2015 audit of the Reeves County contract prison, to improve its monitoring of contract prisons, including in the areas of health and correctional services. The BOP's administration, monitoring, and oversight of contract prisons is conducted through three branches at BOP headquarters and on site. According to the BOP, at each contract prison, two BOP onsite monitors and a BOP Contracting Officer, in cooperation with other BOP subject matter experts, oversee each contractor's compliance with 29 vital functions within 8 operational areas, including correctional programs, correctional services, and health services. The BOP monitors contractor performance through various methods and tools that include monitoring checklists, monitoring logs, written evaluations, performance meetings, and regular audits. Results in Brief We found that in a majority of the categories we examined, contract prisons incurred more safety and security incidents per capita than comparable BOP institutions. We analyzed data from the 14 contract prisons that were operational during the period of our review and from a select group of 14 BOP institutions with comparable inmate populations to evaluate how the contract prisons performed relative to the selected BOP institutions. Our analysis included data from FYs 2011 through 2014 in eight key categories: (1) contraband, (2) reports of incidents, (3) lockdowns, (4) inmate discipline, (5) telephone monitoring, (6) selected grievances, (7) urinalysis drug testing, and (8) sexual misconduct.3 With the exception of fewer incidents of positive drug tests and sexual misconduct, the contract prisons had more incidents per capita than the BOP institutions in all of the other categories of data we examined. For example, the contract prisons confiscated eight times as many contraband cell phones annually on average as the BOP institutions. Contract prisons also had higher rates of assaults, both by inmates on other inmates and by inmates on staff. We note that we were unable to evaluate all of the factors that contributed to the underlying data, including the effect of inmate demographics and facility locations, as the BOP noted in response to a working draft of this report. However, consistent with our recommendation, we believe that the BOP needs to examine the reasons behind our findings more thoroughly and identify corrective actions, if necessary. The three contract prisons we visited were all cited by the BOP for one or more safety and security deficiencies, including administrative infractions such as improper storage of use-of-force video footage, as well as more serious or systemic deficiencies such as failure to initiate discipline in over 50 percent of incidents reviewed by onsite monitors over a 6-month period. The contractors corrected the safety and security deficiencies that the BOP had identified. As a result, the BOP determined that each prison was sufficiently compliant with the safety and security aspects of its contract to continue with the contract during the period covered by our review. However, we concluded that the BOP still must improve its oversight of contract prisons to ensure that federal inmates' rights and needs are not placed at risk when they are housed in contract prisons. Our site visits also revealed that two of the three contract prisons we visited were improperly housing new inmates in Special Housing Units (SHU), which are normally used for disciplinary or administrative segregation, until beds became available in general population housing. These new inmates had not engaged in any of the behaviors cited in American Correctional Association standards and BOP policies that would justify being placed in such administrative or disciplinary segregation. When the OIG discovered this practice during the course of our fieldwork, we brought it to the attention of the BOP Director, who immediately directed that these inmates be removed from the SHUs and returned to the general population. The BOP Director also mandated that the contracts for all contract prisons be modified to prohibit SHU placement for inmates unless there is a policy-based reason to house them there. Since that time, the BOP informed us that the practice of housing new inmates in the SHU is no longer occurring in the contract prisons and that the BOP has not identified any further non-compliance to date regarding this issue. Finally, we found that the BOP needs to improve the way it monitors contract prisons. We focused our analysis on the BOP's Large Secure Adult Contract Oversight Checklist (checklist) because, as described by BOP operating procedures, it is an important element of the BOP's Quality Assurance Plan, as well as a mechanism BOP onsite monitors use to document contract compliance on a daily basis. We believe onsite monitors are best positioned to provide the BOP's quickest and most direct responses to contract compliance issues as they arise. We found that the checklist does not address certain important BOP policy and contract requirements in the areas of health and correctional services. As a result, the BOP cannot as effectively ensure that contract prisons comply with contract requirements and BOP policies in these areas and that inmates in contract prisons receive appropriate health and correctional services. For health services, the checklist does not include observation steps to verify that inmates receive certain basic medical services. For example, the observation steps do not include checks on whether inmates received initial examinations, immunizations, and tuberculosis tests, as BOP policy requires. We also found that monitoring of healthcare for contract compliance lacks coordination from BOP staff responsible for health services oversight. For correctional services, the checklist does not include observation steps to ensure searches of certain areas of the prison, such as inmate housing units or recreation, work, and medical areas, or for validating actual Correctional Officer staffing levels and the daily Correctional Officer duty rosters. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 86p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 1 6-06: Accessed August 29, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1606.pdf Shelf Number: 140070 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ConditionsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Release Preparation Program Summary: During the past 3 years, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) released nearly 125,000 inmates from its custody into Residential Reentry Centers (RRC), into home confinement, or directly into communities in the United States. While not all of these inmates will re-offend, analyses of historical data have shown that many of them will. For example, the U.S. Sentencing Commission recently evaluated recidivism rates for federal offenders released in 2005 and found that nearly half of them were re-arrested within 8 years of their release for committing a new crime or for violating their supervision conditions. To help inmates successfully transition back into the community and to help reduce the likelihood that they will re-offend, the BOP operates, among various reentry efforts, the Release Preparation Program (RPP), which was the focus of this review. The BOP requires every institution to provide an RPP, and most sentenced inmates at BOP-operated institutions are required to participate in the RPP. The RPP consists of classes, instruction, and assistance in six broad categories: (1) Health and Nutrition, (2) Employment, (3) Personal Finance and Consumer Skills, (4) Information and Community Resources, (5) Release Requirements and Procedures, and (6) Personal Growth and Development. The RPP has two segments: the Institution RPP, developed by each institution's RPP committee based on the general release needs of the institution's inmate population, and the Unit RPP, developed by the institution's unit teams based on the needs of the individual inmate. Inmates must complete both segments for the BOP to consider them to have completed the RPP and to be better prepared for their eventual transition back into society. This review examines the BOP's effectiveness in fulfilling the RPP's established program objectives. These objectives are to enhance inmates' successful reintegration into the community through RPP participation; to enter into partnerships with various groups to provide information, programs, and services to releasing inmates; and to reduce inmate recidivism. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-07: Accessed September 2, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1607.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1607.pdf Shelf Number: 140124 Keywords: Federal Bureau of PrisonsPrisoner ReentryPrisoner ReintegrationPrisoner ReleaseRecidivism |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contraband Interdiction Efforts Summary: The Federal Bu reau of Prisons (BOP) faces the persistent problem of contraband smuggling. The introduction of contraband can pose grave dangers to BOP staff and the approximately 200,000 federal inmates in BOP custody, as well as to visitors and the public. The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this review to examine the BOP's security procedures to interdict contraband. We also interviewed representatives from selected state prison systems regard ing their contraband interdiction strategies and staff search policies and procedures. Contraband is defined in 28 C.F.R. § SOO.l(h) as prohibited materials "which can reasonably be expected to cause physical injury or adversely affect the security, safety, or good order of the institution." Such items include weapons, drugs, currency, tobacco, telephones, and electronic devices. According to BOP data, cell phones were the most common type of contraband recovered from fiscal years (FY) 2012 through 2014. An inmate with a cell phone, particularly a smartphone, can carry out criminal activities undetected, including threatening and intimidating witnesses, victims, and public officials, and coordinate escape attempts. The BOP reports that over 8,700 cell phones were recovered during this period, 2,012 more than the next most common contraband type, weapons. The data shows that while cell phone recoveries decreased slightly during this period, recoveries of other contraband, such as weapons, narcotics, and tobacco, increased significantly. However, as described below, we have concerns about the completeness of the BOP's data. Results in Brief The BOP Does Not Have a Comprehensive Contraband Tracking Capability We found that the BOP lacks a comprehensive contraband tracking system, and current data collection methods impede its ability to effectively track contraband recoveries and analyze contraband trends. The BOP has taken steps to automate data collection on contraband recoveries, such as by implementing TRUINTEL, a data base for entering information associated with inmate investigations, including contraband recoveries. However, BOP staff told us TRUINTEL was not designed to be a comprehensive contraband tracking system. We found that TRUINTEL does not provide a complete picture of contraband recoveries because certain contraband may not be entered and multiple contraband items may be entered as only one item. We also found that automated log books used to document contraband recovered during unit searches are not linked to TRUINTEL. With regard to cell phones, TRUINTEL does not capture all data available through the other methods the BOP uses to track recovered cell phones, including both the BOP's unit log books and its "Cell Phones Recovered" reports. Unlike TRUINTEL, the "Cell Phones Recovered" reports include all phones confiscated, regard less of whether the phones are attributed to an inmate; however, these reports lack details that make duplicative entries in TRUINTEL unidentifiable. The BOP Did Not Effectively Implement Its 2013 Staff Search Policy to Deter Staff Introduction of Contraband In a January 2003 report, the OIG recommended that the BOP revise its staff search policy to require searches of staff and their property when entering institutions. After more than 10 years of negotiation with its union, the BOP implemented a new staff search policy in 2013. However, in June 2015, just prior to the completion of our fieldwork for this review, the Federal Labor Relations Authority ordered the BOP to cease and desist using the 2013 staff search policy following a union challenge to it. 1 The BOP then reinstated the policy on March 28, 2016 with minor changes not relevant to this review. As a result, more than 13 years after our 2003 report, the BOP still has no comprehensive and effective staff search policy. We found significant deficiencies with the 2013 policy and its implementation. The policy provided that all staff and their belongings could be searched randomly or based on reasonable suspicion when entering, reentering, or inside an institution or on its grounds. However, the policy did not prescribe any required frequency for conducting random pat searches, resulting in what we found to be infrequent staff pat searches of varying duration. It also allowed staff to possess and use within institutions items, such as tobacco, that are prohibited for inmates. Additionally, despite the BOP concurring in 2003 with the OIG's recommendation that it restrict the size and content of personal property that staff may bring into institutions, the 2013 policy contained no such restrictions. The policy further permitted staff to return to their vehicles to store contraband that had been identified during front lobby screening procedures, unless doing so would jeopardize the safety, security, or good order of the institution, or public safety. Finally, the policy did not ensure that only trained and supervised staff was assigned to front lobby positions, and we found that at some institutions entry-level Information Receptionists were assigned to these positions. Our research also indicated that the staff search policies governing state prison systems are often more strict in many of these areas. The safety and security of staff and inmates will continue to be at risk until the BOP develops and implements a comprehensive and effective staff search policy. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 85p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-05: Accessed September 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1605.pdf#page=1 Shelf Number: 145579 Keywords: Contraband GoodFederal Bureau of PrisonsPrison ContrabandSmuggling of Goods |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Untimely Releases of Inmates Summary: Following news reports that the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) had confined an inmate for 13 months past his correct release date, the Department of Justice (Department) Office of the Inspector General (OIG) initiated an examination of the BOP's process for ensuring federal inmates are released on their correct release dates and the incidences of releases before or after the correct release date due to staff error between 2009 and 2014. We found that of the 461,966 inmate releases between 2009 and 2014, the BOP categorized 157 as untimely due to staff error. We also learned that the BOP classifies a far greater number - 4,183 - as untimely for other reasons. According to the BOP, the vast majority of non-staff error "untimely" releases were due to situations that are beyond its control, such as amended sentences that result in shorter sentences than the time an inmate had already served. Also, data and information we reviewed indicates that other entities inside and outside the Department may sometimes contribute to untimely releases. Although BOP officials told us that it was highly unlikely that staff error on the part of a Department entity contributed to any of the 4,183 cases, they could not rule out the possibility and we found that the BOP does not always have complete information about the circumstances of untimely releases to which other entities contribute. We therefore concluded that the Department should work with all relevant entities, both within and outside the Department, to review the full range of possible reasons for untimely releases and how to address those that are in any way preventable. With regard to the 157 untimely releases that BOP categorized as due to staff error, 152 were late releases and 5 were early releases. We found that three of the late releases and three of the early releases involved an error resulting in more than 1 year of over- or under-served time by the inmate. Table 1 displays the number of days of over- or under-served time for the 157 untimely releases. While the 157 untimely releases due to staff error was rare compared to the 461,966 releases by BOP during the 6-year period of our review (an error rate of 0.03 percent), the consequences of an untimely release can be extraordinarily serious. Late releases from prison deprive inmates of their liberty, while early releases can put communities at risk if the inmates are dangerous. Early releases also can harm an inmate and the inmate's family, particularly if the inmate's efforts to gain employment and reestablish ties with the community are interrupted by a re-arrest for the purpose of completing the sentence. Late releases also are costly: in addition to BOP costs associated with the unauthorized period of incarceration, there is the potential for significant compensatory judgments to those inmates who suffered an unconstitutional deprivation of their liberty. For the 152 late releases, we estimated the total cost to the BOP, exclusive of litigation and settlement costs, to be approximately $669,814. In addition, between 2009 and 2015, the Department settled four lawsuits by inmates alleging untimely release, one for $90,000; another for $120,000; another for $295,000; and the fourth for $175,000. This does not include additional costs the Department incurred as a result of these cases, such as salary costs expended to handle the lawsuits. Additionally, untimely releases, whether early or late, contravene judicial sentencing orders, yet the BOP does not have in place a process to consider whether to notify the sentencing court of an untimely release. We found that, for late releases, the BOP notifies the relevant U.S. Probation office but does not separately notify the sentencing court or the U.S. Attorney's Office that handled the case. For early releases, we found that BOP policy requires Wardens to notify "the appropriate Judicial Official(s)" when an inmate who is deemed to be a threat to the community is released early and when any inmate is released more than 30 days early. Despite this policy, we found no such notifications occurred for the four untimely early releases of 30 days or more that we reviewed. We found that 127 of the 157 untimely releases due to staff error were the result of errors made at BOP's Designation and Sentence Computation Center (DSCC). (The DSCC performs the vast majority of sentence computations the BOP uses to determine an inmate's release date.) The other 30 untimely releases were the result of staff errors at non-DSCC entities, such as BOP institutions, BOP Residential Reentry Management field offices, Residential Reentry Centers (previously known as Community Corrections Centers), and private contract prisons. Prior to 2005, when the BOP consolidated sentence computation functions in the DSCC, individual BOP facilities across the country had performed sentence computation. The BOP transitioned sentence computations to the DSCC in order to consolidate BOP sentence computation functions, reduce costs, and ensure consistent application of laws and BOP policies. This change also helped reduce the number of untimely releases caused by staff error. Based on BOP data, we determined that during the 6-year period from 1999 and 2004 there were approximately 344 untimely releases due to staff error (around 0.1 percent of all releases) compared to 157 (around 0.03 percent of all releases) between 2009 and 2014. We concluded that the most common sentence computation errors resulted from incorrect application of jail credit, incorrect determinations of primary jurisdiction between federal and state custody, and errors relating to concurrent versus consecutive sentences for defendants with multiple unexpired incarceration sentences. We also found that poor communication with outside entities - including local jails, courthouses, state departments of corrections, Native American reservations, the U.S. Marshals Service, and others - resulted in DSCC staff not obtaining complete and accurate sentencing information or interpreting sentencing information incorrectly, leading to untimely releases. The BOP has several processes in place to prevent untimely release. One is to conduct a final release audit 12 months prior to an inmate's scheduled release date to discover and correct any errors and to have the ability to account for any reduced sentence time. However, we found that in some cases 12 months is not early enough to discover and correct the error and prevent the untimely release. Specifically, 14 of the 19 errors discovered by final release audits might not have resulted in untimely releases had the audits occurred 18 months before the inmate's scheduled release date. Had the final release audit occurred 24 months prior to the release date, an additional 4 of the 19 errors might have been discovered in time to prevent the untimely release. Therefore, we recommend that BOP explore and implement additional sentence calculation processing or auditing strategies, taking into account that conducting final release audits only 12 months before an inmate's projected release date has led to preventable untimely releases. We also noted that the DSCC holds education events that bring together officials from the DSCC as well as outside the BOP (including U.S. District Court Judges, Federal Public Defenders, and U.S. Probation Office staff) to inform them about topics relating to DSCC operations, such as sentence computations. In our judgment, these events could help prevent untimely releases if the BOP included factors that can affect its ability to release inmates on time, including showing attendees how conflicting information can lead to incorrect sentence computations. This report contains three case studies profiling inmate releases that were more than 1 year late. The report also makes seven recommendations for the BOP to help reduce untimely releases due to staff error. Details: Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, 2016. 41p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 16-03 : Accessed September 23, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1603.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/e1603.pdf Shelf Number: 146051 Keywords: Federal Bureau of PrisonsInmatesPrisoner Release |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Contract with CoreCivic, Inc. to Operate the Adams County Correctional Center in Natchez, Mississippi Summary: In April 2009, the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded a contract to Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), which is now known as CoreCivic, Inc., to house up to 2,567 low-security, non-U.S. citizen adult male inmates in the Adams County Correctional Center (Adams County). The BOP exercised the contract's second of three 2-year option periods in 2015, extending it through July 2017 and increasing its value to about $468 million. As of June 2016, it was the third largest Department of Justice (Department or DOJ) contract in terms of dollars obligated since fiscal year (FY) 2009. The DOJ Office of the Inspector General (OIG) conducted this audit, covering the period April 1, 2012, through March 31, 2015, to: (1) assess CoreCivic's contract performance; (2) determine whether CoreCivic complied with the terms, conditions, laws, and regulations applicable to the contract; and (3) assess the BOP's formation and administration of the contract. We found that CoreCivic's execution of the contract's requirements did not fully accomplish the BOP's program. goals in several respects. In May 2012, an inmate riot at the facility resulted in a correctional officer's death and injuries to approximately 20 staff and inmates. The riot, according to a Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) affidavit, was a consequence of what inmates perceived to be inadequate medical care, substandard food, and disrespectful staff members. A BOP after-action report found deficiencies in staffing levels, staff experience, communication between staff and inmates, and CoreCivic's intelligence systems. The report specifically cited the lack of Spanish-speaking staff and staff inexperience. Four years after the riot, we were deeply concerned to find that the facility was plagued by the same significant deficiencies in correctional and health services and Spanish-speaking staffing. In 19 of the 38 months following the riot, we found CoreCivic staffed correctional services at an even lower level than at the time of the riot in terms of actual post coverage. Yet CoreCivic's monthly reports to the BOP, which were based on simple headcounts, showed that correctional staffing levels had improved in 36 of those 38 months. With regard to Spanish-speaking staff, while the BOP's post-riot after-action plan recommended adding to the contract minimum requirements for bilingual staff, we found that the BOP did not modify the contract to include this requirement until June 2015, subsequent to the start of our audit. Moreover, the contract modification does not define the level of speaking proficiency required and has no deadline or target date for compliance. As of July 2015, the facility's inmate population consisted of approximately 2,300 aliens, predominately Mexican-nationals, yet only 4 of 367 staff spoke fluent Spanish. By February 2016, CoreCivic officials told us the number of fluent Spanish-speaking staff actually dropped to three people, and CoreCivic's January 2016 job announcements for correctional officers stated no preference for bilingual applicants. In addition, the BOP told us that it does not validate the contractor's staff for Spanish-speaking skills, and has not established any validation criteria for doing so. We also found lower qualification levels and significantly higher staffing turnover rates for Adams County correctional officers and believe these factors contributed to the facility's lack of experienced staff, which the BOP identified in its after-action report as a systemic problem in the area of safety and security at the facility. We reviewed CoreCivic's hiring practices and determined the facility employs correctional officers with qualifications that would have been insufficient for employment at BOP-managed institutions. For example, the BOP requires entry-level correctional officers to have either a 4-year college degree or equivalent work experience, while CoreCivic does not require education beyond high school. Additionally, we found significantly higher turnover rates at the facility than those at comparable BOP institutions and believe it likely results from the substantially lower pay and benefits provided by CoreCivic. We found CoreCivic pays significantly lower wages and offers less time off than the BOP, and provides fewer career advancement opportunities. For example, the BOP pays entry-level correctional officers $18.69 per hour, 48 percent higher than the $12.60 per hour paid by CoreCivic. The State of Mississippi also offers its correctional officers more generous wages and paid time off than CoreCivic. Furthermore, the BOP offers new correctional officers noncompetitive promotion potential to $26.91 an hour, while CoreCivic pays correctional officers, throughout their careers, only the required prevailing wage rates set forth by the Department of Labor's Service Contract Act wage determinations. The BOP's contract with CoreCivic does not address either correctional officer qualification requirements or staff pay and benefits. We believe the BOP should evaluate the extent to which employee qualification levels and turnover rates impact safety and security concerns, and whether its contractual terms should be modified to address those concerns. In addition, while the BOP's solicitation that resulted in the Adams County contract required companies to develop a staffing plan that would illustrate the "total number of full-time equivalents (FTE) for each position title," based on our discussions with BOP and CoreCivic officials, it became apparent that the contract was vague about how staffing levels should be calculated. A 2011 contract modification provided that staffing levels should not fall below a monthly average of 90 percent for Correctional Services and 85 percent for Health Services of the BOP-approved staffing plan. Both the BOP and CoreCivic told us they interpreted the contract to allow the calculation of staffing levels to be based on headcounts rather than FTE, and leave the determination of day-to-day staff assignments to the discretion of CoreCivic. As a result, we found the staffing levels CoreCivic reported to the BOP reflected neither actual staffing at the facility nor staffing insufficiencies. Specifically, CoreCivic reported to the BOP simple headcounts of staff recorded on payroll records, regardless of the hours each employee actually worked. When we re-calculated correctional services staffing levels based on FTEs using time and attendance records, we found that, throughout the 4-year period we reviewed, staffing levels were lower than the levels represented by CoreCivic's headcounts and were frequently lower than the BOP's minimum staffing threshold. We found similar issues regarding CoreCivic's reporting of health services staffing. Because the BOP was unaware of these staffing insufficiencies, it was unable to assess the adequacy of staffing levels at the facility. When we reported these issues and our concerns about them to BOP officials, they told us CoreCivic's reporting was consistent with the contract. We found that had the contract clearly specified that staffing levels should be measured using FTEs, between July 2011 and July 2015 the BOP could have taken $1,927,307 in invoice deductions as a result of inadequate correctional and health services staffing levels. We believe this nearly $2 million that the BOP expended could have been avoided with more precise contract language and was wasteful. We also found that, beginning in December 2012, CoreCivic excluded from its required staffing reports the status of five critical health services positions identified in the approved staffing plan, namely two dentists, two physicians, and one advanced registered nurse practitioner. As a result, the BOP, which was not notified of and did not identify the change, was unable to assess the effect of any vacancies on service provision or invoice amounts. We believe that this gap in oversight had a negative effect on CoreCivic's ability to provide quality health care at the Adams County facility. In fact, we found that between December 2012 and September 2015, the Adams County facility was staffed with only a single physician for 434 days (43 percent of the time) and a single dentist for 689 days (69 percent of the time), resulting in inmate-to-provider ratios that were about double those specified in BOP program statements. Finally, we found several aspects of the BOP's control and oversight of the contract performance to be inadequate. The BOP structured this contract as a performance-based acquisition, for which the Federal Acquisition Regulation requires a performance work statement, measurable performance standards, and a method of assessing contractor performance against those standards. However, the BOP did not implement appropriate performance standards to measure and evaluate CoreCivic's performance. For example, the BOP's oversight of staffing levels is limited because the contract requirements do not sufficiently specify how CoreCivic should measure and report facility staffing levels. We also found CoreCivic inconsistently used industry-standard dietary guidelines to evaluate the nutritional adequacy of food service offerings at the facility, an issue that may have been avoided had the contract specified which standards CoreCivic should have followed. Additionally, the BOP's oversight of billings was inadequate in several ways, resulting in the BOP failing to identify instances where CoreCivic did not apply mandatory invoice deductions. In August 2016, the Deputy Attorney General directed the BOP to begin reducing, and ultimately end, its use of privately operated prisons. Because this order was issued after the close of our audit period, any analysis of its basis or effect were outside of this audit's scope. This report makes 9 recommendations to assist the BOP in improving operations under the Adams County contract and in addressing $42,300 we have identified as questioned costs. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 73p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1708.pdf Shelf Number: 145091 Keywords: Correctional AdministrationFederal Bureau of PrisonsFederal PrisonsPrivate PrisonsPrivatization |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Management of Inmate Placements in Residential Reentry Centers and Home Confinement Summary: The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) provides a variety of reentry programming to help incarcerated inmates successfully transition back into society. As part of its release preparation, BOP has the authority to place inmates in residential reentry centers (RRC), also known as halfway houses, and/or home confinement while serving the remainder of their sentences. BOP may determine that an inmate should not be placed into either an RRC or home confinement because, for example, the inmate poses a significant threat to the community. An inmate placed in an RRC and/or home confinement remains in BOP custody. RRCs provide a supervised environment that support inmates in finding employment and housing, completing necessary programming such as drug abuse treatment, participating in counseling, and strengthening ties to family and friends. Home confinement provides similar opportunities, but is used for inmates BOP believes do not need the structure provided by RRCs. Inmates placed in home confinement are monitored and are required to remain at home when not working or participating in release programing and other approved activities. Pursuant to the Second Chance Act of 2007, all federal inmates are eligible for RRC and home confinement placement. However, BOP's placement decisions are supposed to be driven by an individual assessment weighing an inmate's need for reentry services against the risk to the community. Inmates can be placed in RRCs for up to 12 months but can only spend a maximum of 6 months, or 10 percent of the term of imprisonment, whichever is shorter, in home confinement. In fiscal year 2015, the BOP spent $360 million on RRC and home confinement costs and, as of September 2016, BOP reported having 181 RRCs operated by 103 different contractors. The Office of the Inspector General assessed BOP’s RRC and home confinement programs, including its placement policy and practices, program capacity planning and management, and strategic planning and performance management. The audit covers inmates released from BOP custody from October 2013 through April 2016, either directly from BOP institutions, RRCs, or home confinement. Based on our analysis, we found that 94,252 inmates released from BOP custody during the scope of our audit were eligible for placement in an RRC and/or home confinement. BOP placed 79 percent of these eligible inmates into RRCs and/or home confinement - 75 percent were initially placed in RRCs and only 4 percent went directly into home confinement. The remaining 21 percent were released directly from a BOP institution. Our audit found that BOP's RRC and home confinement placement policies and guidance, which are designed to identify individual inmate risks and needs while simultaneously weighing these against the safety of the community and available resources, appear reasonable. In our judgment, the inmate's security level at the time of placement is the best indicator of inmate risk and need for transitional services because it incorporates key recidivism risk factors, as well the inmate's behavior during incarceration. As a result, we analyzed BOP’s RRC and home confinement placement practices based on the exit security level of inmates released from BOP custody during the scope of our audit. Our analysis determined that, contrary to BOP policy, BOP guidance, and relevant research, BOP's RRC and home confinement placement decisions are not based on inmate risk for recidivism or need for transitional services. Rather, we found that BOP is placing the great majority of eligible inmates into RRCs regardless of inmate risk for recidivism or need for transitional services, unless the inmate is deemed not suitable for such placement because the inmate poses a significant threat to the community. As a result, low-risk, low-need inmates are far more likely to be placed in RRCs than high-risk, high-need inmates. Specifically, we found that of the 94,252 inmates released between October 2013 and April 23, 2016, 90 percent of minimum security and 75 percent of low security inmates are placed in RRCs and/or home confinement. However, only 58 percent of high security level inmates were transitioned into the community through RRCs, while 42 percent were released into the community directly from a BOP institution. We recognize this may be a result of the fact that many of the high security inmates were considered a public safety risk. Nonetheless, at the time they would be placed in an RRC, on average these inmates are within 4 months of being released into the community upon completion of their sentence. Thus BOP must weigh the immediate risk of placing high-risk inmates in RRCs against the risk of releasing them back into society directly from BOP institutions without transitional reentry programming. It also appears that BOP is underutilizing direct home confinement placement as an alternative to RRC placement for transitioning low-risk, low-need inmates back into society. This underutilization of direct home confinement placement was evident when we reviewed data on placement of minimum and low security inmates and found that BOP placed only 6 percent of even those lower risk inmates directly into home confinement, despite BOP policy and guidance stating that direct home confinement placement is the preferred placement for low-risk, low-need inmates. This is particularly concerning given that BOP guidance, as well as the research cited in the guidance, indicates that low-risk inmates do not benefit from and may in fact be harmed by RRC placement because, among other things, of their exposure to high-risk offenders in those facilities. Moreover, the underutilization of direct home confinement for low-risk, low need inmates results in fewer RRC resources being available for high-risk, high-need inmates since the RRC inmate population is already at or in excess of BOP’s contracted capacity. In addition, this practice may also further strain high security BOP institutions that are already well above capacity. We found that, from October 2013 through March 2016, the RRC population has remained at about 101 percent of contracted capacity, while the home confinement population averaged nearly 159 percent of contracted monitoring capacity, despite BOP’s apparent underutilization of it as an alternative to RRC placement. The home confinement capacity issues resulted, at least in part, from BOP’s policy to aggressively pursue transitioning inmates from RRCs to home confinement as soon as possible in an effort to increase RRC capacity. This reduces the capacity for direct home confinement placements and, additionally, may result in inmates being transitioned from RRCs to home confinement too early, as evidenced by the fact that 17 percent of inmates were placed back into RRCs for violating home confinement program rules. We also found that BOP lacks adequate performance measures to evaluate the success of its RRC and home confinement programming. Although BOP has RRC and home confinement placement targets, these targets do not measure the effectiveness of RRC and home confinement programs. Additionally, the placement targets – 85 percent from minimum, 75 percent from low, 70 percent from medium, and 65 percent from high security level institutions – appear to encourage institutions to maximize the number of inmates placed in RRCs or home confinement, regardless of transitional need. In fact, the issues we identified with BOP’s current placement practices may be driven, in part, by its RRC and home confinement placement targets. The success of BOP’s RRC and home confinement programs relies on the quality of programming provided by its RRC contractors, all of whom also provide services to and monitor inmates in home confinement. However, we found that BOP’s policy for monitoring its RRC contractors focuses on assessing compliance with the contractual Statements of Work, rather than assessing the quality of services provided by the RRC contractors. Specifically, we did not identify any requirement that RRC contractors or BOP collect, retain, and report any statistics pertaining to RRC or home confinement program performance or success or failure rates. If these measures were available, BOP could then incorporate these figures into its strategic planning, which might assist it in assessing its programs and RRC contractors based on measurable qualitative achievements as opposed to simply trying to meet numerical quotas. Our report makes five recommendations to improve BOP’s management of inmate placements in RRCs and home confinement. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, 2016. 56p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 17-01: Accessed December 21, 2016 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1701.pdf Year: 2016 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2016/a1701.pdf Shelf Number: 147774 Keywords: Federal Bureau of PrisonsHalfway HousesHome ConfinementOffender ManagementPrisoner ReentryResidential Facilities |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Evaluation and Inspections Division Title: Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Use of Restrictive Housing for Inmates with Mental Illness Summary: Introduction The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for confining offenders in environments that are safe, humane, cost-efficient, and appropriately secure. To do so, the BOP utilizes various forms of Restrictive Housing Unit (RHU) to confine certain inmates, including those with mental illness. However, according to recent research and reports, as well as the BOP's own policy, confinement in RHUs, even for relatively short periods of time, can adversely affect inmates' mental health and can be particularly harmful for inmates with mental illness. As of June 2016, of the 148,227 sentenced inmates in the BOP's 122 institutions, 9,749 inmates (7 percent) were housed in its three largest forms of RHU: Special Housing Units (SHU) in 111 institutions; 2 Special Management Units (SMU) at the U.S. Penitentiaries (USP) in Lewisburg and Allenwood, Pennsylvania; and the USP Administrative Maximum Security Facility (ADX) in Florence, Colorado. The Office of the Inspector General conducted this review to examine the BOP's use of RHUs for inmates with mental illness, including trends in the use of restrictive housing and the screening, treatment, and monitoring of inmates with mental illness who are housed in RHUs. We found significant issues with the adequacy of the BOP's policies and its implementation efforts in this critical area. Results in Brief BOP Policies Do Not Adequately Address the Confinement of Inmates with Mental Illness in RHUs, and the BOP Does Not Sufficiently Track or Monitor Such Inmates BOP guidance and policies do not clearly define "restrictive housing" or "extended placement." Although the BOP states that it does not practice solitary confinement, or even recognize the term, we found inmates, including those with mental illness, who were housed in single-cell confinement for long periods of time, isolated from other inmates and with limited human contact. For example, at the ADX, we observed an RHU that held two inmates, each in their own cell, isolated from other inmates. The inmates did not engage in recreation with each other or with other inmates and were confined to their cells for over 22 hours a day. Also, in five SHUs, we observed single-celled inmates, many with serious mental illness. One inmate, who we were told was denied ADX placement for mental health reasons, had been single-celled for about 4 years. Although the BOP generally imposes a minimum amount of time that inmates must spend in RHUs, it does not limit the maximum amount of time and does not monitor inmates' cumulative time in RHUs. The BOP also does not track its housing of inmates in single-cell RHU confinement, nor does it account for their confinement in all RHUs throughout BOP institutions. As a result, inmates, including those with mental illness, may spend years and even decades in RHUs. For example, we learned of an inmate with serious mental illness who spent about 19 years at the ADX before being transferred to a secure residential mental health treatment program. In addition, our sample of inmates with mental illness showed that they had been placed in the ADX for an average of about 69 months. Similarly, we found that between fiscal years (FY) 2008 and 2015, inmates with mental illness averaged about 896 consecutive days, or about 29 months, in the SMU. We further found that inmates with mental illness spend disproportionately longer periods of time in RHUs than their peers. Equally concerning, our review showed that 13 percent of the inmates with mental illness in our sample were released by the BOP directly into the community after spending nearly 29 months in the SMU prior to their release. By contrast, officials in six of the eight state departments of corrections told us that they limit the length of time inmates with mental illness can be placed in restrictive housing. In 2015, three states (Massachusetts, Mississippi, and New York) had at least a 30-day limit, while three other states (Colorado, Maine, and Pennsylvania) no longer placed inmates with serious mental illness in RHUs at all. Mental Health Staff Do Not Always Document Inmates' Mental Disorders, Leaving the BOP Unable to Accurately Determine the Number of Inmates with Mental Illness and Ensure that It Is Providing Appropriate Care to Them BOP data showed that, as of 2015, only 3 percent of the BOP's sentenced inmate population was being treated regularly for mental illness. Yet, the BOP's FY 2016 Performance Budget Congressional Submission cited an internal BOP study, which suggested that approximately 19 percent of federal inmates had a history of mental illness. Moreover, a 2006 Bureau of Justice Statistics report concluded that 45 percent of federal inmates had symptoms or a recent history of mental illness. We found that the BOP cannot accurately determine the number of inmates who have mental illness because institution staff do not always document mental disorders. The BOP's FY 2014 data estimates that approximately 12 percent of inmates have a history of mental illness; however, in 2015, the BOP's Chief Psychiatrist estimated, based on discussions with institutions' Psychology Services staffs, that approximately 40 percent of inmates have mental illness, excluding inmates with only personality disorder diagnoses. Similarly, one institution's Deputy Chief Psychologist estimated that 50 percent of that institution's inmates may have Antisocial Personality Disorder; nevertheless, we found that this disorder was documented for only about 3.3 percent of the BOP's total inmate population. Because mental health staffs do not always document inmates' mental disorders, the BOP is unable to ensure that it is providing appropriate care to them. Since the BOP Adopted Its New Mental Health Policy, BOP Data Shows a 30 Percent Reduction in Inmates Who Receive Regular Mental Health Treatment The BOP adopted a new mental health policy in 2014, increasing the standards of care for inmates with mental illness. However, since the policy was issued, the total number of inmates who receive regular mental health treatment decreased by approximately 30 percent, including 56 percent for inmates in SMUs, and about 20 percent overall for inmates in RHUs during the scope of our review. Based on our review, it appears that mental health staff may have reduced the number of inmates, including those in RHUs, who must receive regular mental health treatment because they did not have the necessary staffing resources to meet the policy's increased treatment standards. Indeed, we found that, as of October 2015, the BOP had filled only 57 percent of its authorized full-time Psychiatrist positions nationwide and that it had significant staffing issues with regard to Psychologist positions as well. This treatment trend was particularly pronounced among SMU inmates at USP Lewisburg, which confined over 1,100 SMU inmates as of June 2016. Based on our sample of SMU inmates, we found that, prior to the new policy, the number of inmates (16) whose mental health care level was increased equaled the number of inmates (16) whose care level was decreased. In contrast, after the new policy was adopted, all 27 inmates whose care level changed had a decrease and therefore ostensibly required less treatment. By May 2015, only about 2.5 percent of SMU inmates at USP Lewisburg were categorized as requiring regular treatment, compared to about 11 percent of ADX inmates and 7 percent of SHU inmates nationwide, which we believe raises treatment concerns for inmates in USP Lewisburg's SMU. While the BOP Has Taken Recent Steps to Mitigate Mental Health Concerns for Inmates in RHUs, Additional Actions Can Be Taken The BOP has taken a number of steps to mitigate the mental health concerns for inmates in RHUs. These efforts include diverting inmates with serious mental illness from placement in traditional RHUs (i.e., SHUs, the SMUs, and the ADX) and into alternative programs such as secure residential mental health treatment programs. While these are positive BOP initiatives, limited inmate capacities, slow inmate progression through the programs, high staffing needs, and a lack of formal performance metrics with which to measure the effectiveness of these programs limit their utility and the BOP's ability to expand their use to other institutions. Details: Washington, DC: Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice, 2017. 103p. Source: Internet Resource: Evaluation and Inspections Division 17-05 : Accessed September 20, 2017 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1705.pdf Year: 2017 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2017/e1705.pdf Shelf Number: 147413 Keywords: Federal Bureau of PrisonsIsolationMental Health ServicesMentally Ill InmatesMentally Ill OffendersMentally Ill PrisonersRestrictive HousingSolitary Confinement |
Author: U.S. Government Accountability Office Title: Bureau of Prisons: Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best Practices, but Quantifying Risks Would Enhance Decision Making Summary: Why GAO Did This Study Highlights Accountability Integrity Reliability November 2009 BUREAU OF PRISONS Methods for Cost Estimation Largely Reflect Best Practices, but Quantifying Risks Would Enhance Highlights of GAO-10-94, a report to Decision Making congressional committees The Department of Justice's (DOJ) Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) is responsible for the custody and care of about 209,000 federal inmates-a population which has grown by 44 percent over the last decade. In fiscal years 2008 and 2009, the President requested additional funding for BOP because costs for key operations were at risk of exceeding appropriated funding levels. GAO was congressionally directed to examine (1) how BOP estimates costs when developing its annual budget request to DOJ; (2) the extent to which BOP's methods for estimating costs follow established best practices; and (3) the extent to which BOP's costs for key operations exceeded requested funding levels identified in the President's budget in recent years, and how this has affected BOP's ability to manage its growing inmate population. In conducting our work, GAO analyzed BOP budget documents, interviewed BOP and DOJ officials, and compared BOP's cost estimation documentation to criteria in GAO's Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends that BOP (1) conduct an uncertainty analysis quantifying the extent to which its operational costs could vary due to changes in key cost assumptions and submit the results, along with budget documentation, to DOJ; and (2) improve documentation of calculations used to estimate its costs. BOP agreed with GAO's recommendations. Details: Washington, DC: GAO, 2009. 71p. Source: Internet Resource: Accessed April 17, 2018 at: https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1094.pdf Year: 2009 Country: United States URL: https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d1094.pdf Shelf Number: 117109 Keywords: Costs of CorrectionsCosts of Criminal JusticeCosts of PrisonFederal Bureau of Prisons |
Author: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Audit Division Title: Audit of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Residential Reentry Center Contracts Awarded to Reynolds & Associates, Inc., Washington, D.C. Summary: Objective - The Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) awarded three contracts valued at nearly $18 million to Reynolds & Associates, Inc. (Reynolds), to provide residential reentry services from 2011 to 2021 for female offenders at its Fairview facility in Washington, D.C. The objective of this audit was to assess the BOP's contract administration, as well as Reynolds' performance and compliance with requirements applicable to these residential reentry center (RRC) contracts. Results in Brief - The audit found that the BOP needs to strengthen its process to ensure price analysis documents show that the contract prices were fair and reasonable, did not adequately plan for the most recent firm-fixed-price (FFP) contract, and could improve its monitoring of Reynolds' compliance with the RRC requirements. While Reynolds met a number of important RRC requirements, it did not keep records required to support all paid services, and its Fairview facility experienced staffing challenges that contributed to repeated BOP-identified deficiencies. Lastly, we identified that Reynolds did not consistently track or collect subsistence payments from RRC residents. We believe that the BOP needs to strengthen RRC contract award procedures and oversight and Reynolds must improve how it documents its performance of many core RRC functions. Recommendations Our report includes 16 recommendations to the BOP to improve its RRC contract awarding and monitoring procedures, particularly with regard to Reynolds' Fairview RRC. We requested a response to our draft audit report from the BOP and Reynolds, which can be found respectively in Appendices 2 and 3. Our analysis of those responses is included in Appendix 4. Details: Washington, DC: OIG, 2018. 95p. Source: Internet Resource: Audit Division 18-30: Accessed October 5, 2018 at: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1830.pdf#page=1 Year: 2018 Country: United States URL: https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2018/a1830.pdf#page=1 Shelf Number: 152946 Keywords: Federal Bureau of PrisonsFemale OffendersPrisoner ReentryPrisoners |